

Political Economics

Economia do Setor Público II

Departamento de Economia
Universidade de Brasília
1º Semestre/2015

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Horário: Quartas-feiras 8:00-12:00

Visão geral do curso¹: Este curso expõe as respostas empíricas para perguntas importantes da economia política no setor público, e visa dotar os alunos com um conjunto de ferramentas empíricas de investigação comuns à área.

Avaliação:

- | | |
|--------------------------|-----|
| - Participação | 40% |
| - Parecer de trabalhos | 25% |
| - exercício econométrico | 20% |
| - Apresentações | 15% |

Participação: Participação inclui ler e opinar sobre os artigos que forem designados para cada uma das aulas.

Se tenho a impressão que você não leu os artigos que forem designados para a aula, vou tirar um ponto da sua nota final, cada vez que isso acontece. Por exemplo, se você foi para duas aulas sem ter lido os artigos, a nota máxima que você vai poder alcançar na matéria é 10-2=8 (MS).

Parecer de trabalhos: Você escreverá dois pareceres de trabalho acadêmico (você poderá escolher dois artigos na lista de referências abaixo). Cada parecer deve ser de até (e cerca de) três páginas com espaçamento simples. O relatório deve começar com um curto parágrafo de resumo do principal argumento do artigo. Em seguida, deve apresentar as principais críticas do artigo. O relatório deve concluir com comentários de menor relevância. Um bom parecer não somente resalta claramente as deficiências do artigo, mas também oferece sugestões construtivas, detalhadas e realistas para a melhoria do trabalho. O parecer deve ser preparado em *Latex*. Um guia como escrever um parecer é aqui: <http://are.berkeley.edu/courses/ARE251/2004/assignments/RRGuidelines.pdf>

Exercício econométrico: Você vai fazer alguns próprios estimções baseado em dados que vou indicar.

¹ O conteúdo desse curso é baseado no curso "Economia Política" do Prof. Claudio Ferraz (PUC-Rio), "Political Economics II" do Prof. Torsten Persson (IIES), "Topics in Empirical Political Economy" da Prof. Katja Zhuravskaya (PSE).

Apresentações: Cada aluno apresentará duas vezes durante o semestre. Cada apresentação deverá resumir brevemente o artigo (pergunta de pesquisa, modelo teórico, estratégia empírica, dados, resultados, conclusão). A apresentação deve ser preparada em *Latex*.

Conteúdo Programático:

1. O Governo responde ao eleitor, e vice-versa?

O Governo responde ao eleitor mediano?

- Bardhan, Pranab and Dilip Mookherjee (2010) "Determinants of Redistributive Politics: An Empirical Analysis of Land Reforms in West Bengal, India", *American Economic Review*, 100(4), pp. 1572-1600.
- Husted and Kenny (1997), "The effects of the expansion of the voting franchise on the size of government", *Journal of Political Economy*, 105, 1997, pp. 54-81.
- Miller, G. (2008), "Women's Suffrage, Political Responsiveness, and Child Survival in American History", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 123(3), pp. 1287-1327.
- Mobarak, Rajkumar, and Cropper (2011) "The Political Economy of Health Services Provision in Brazil", *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, Vol. 59, No. 4
- Bursztyn (2013) "Poverty and the Political Economy of Public Education Spending: Evidence from Brazil", Mimeo

O Eleitor responde ao governo?

- Levitt, S. D. and J. M. Snyder, (1997), "The impact of federal spending on House election outcomes," *Journal of Political Economy*, 105(1), pp. 30-53.
- Manacorda, Marco, Edward Miguel, and Andrea Vigorito. (2011). "Government Transfers and Political Support", *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 3(3), pp. 1-28.
- Sakurai, Sergio Naruhiko, and Naercio Aquino Menezes-Filho. "Fiscal policy and reelection in Brazilian municipalities." *Public Choice* 137.1-2 (2008): 301-314.
- Litschig, Stephan and Kevin Morrison (2010), "Government Spending and Re-election: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Brazilian Municipalities", Mimeo, UPF.
- Ferraz, C. e Finan, C. (2008), "Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effect of Brazil's Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 123, pp. 703-745.
- Figueiredo, Hidalgo, Kasahara (2014) "When Do Voters Punish Corrupt Politicians? Experimental Evidence from Brazil", Mimeo
- Banerjee, Abhijit et al. (2010), "Do Informed Voters Make Better Choices? Experimental Evidence from Urban India", Mimeo, MIT.

2. Ideologia de políticos importa?

- Ferreira, Fernando and Joseph Gyourko (2009) "Do Political Parties Matter? Evidence from U.S. Cities", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 124(1), pp. 399-422.
- Lee, David S., Enrico Moretti, and Matthew Butler, (2004), "Do Voters Affect or Elect Policies? Evidence from the U.S. House", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 119(3), pp. 807-860.
- Levitt, S. (1996), "How do senators vote? Disentangling the role of voter preferences, party affiliation, and senator ideology", *American Economic Review*, 86, pp. 425-441.

- Pettersson-Lidbom, Per (2008), "Do Parties Matter for Economic Outcomes: A Regression-Discontinuity Approach," *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 6(5), pp. 1037-1056.
- Snowberg, Erik, Justin Wolfers and Eric Zitzewitz (2007), "Partisan Impacts on the Economy: Evidence from Prediction Markets and Close Elections," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 122(2), pp. 807-829.
- Jones, Ben, and Ben Olken (2005), "Do Leaders Matter? National Leadership and Growth since World War II," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 120(3), pp. 835-864.
- Washington, E. (2008). "Female Socialization: How Daughters Affect Their Legislators' Voting on Women's Issues," *American Economic Review*, 98(1), pp. 311-332.
- Chattopadhyay, R. and E. Duflo (2004), "Women as policy makers: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in India," *Econometrica*, 72, pp. 1409-1443.
- Brollo & Troiano (2014) "What Happens When a Woman Wins an Election? Evidence from Close Races in Brazil," Mimeo
- Pande, R. (2003) "Can Mandated Political Representation Increase Policy Influence for Disadvantaged Minorities? Theory and Evidence from India," *American Economic Review*, 93, pp. 1132-1151.

3. Organização legislativa importa?

- Baqir, Reza (2002), "Districting and Government Overspending," *Journal of Political Economy*, 110.
- Egger, Peter and Marko Koethenbueger (2010), "Government Spending and Legislative Organization: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Germany," *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 2, pp. 200-212.
- DelRossi, Alison F. and Inman, Robert P. (1999), "Changing the price of pork: the impact of local cost sharing on legislators' demands for distributive public goods," *Journal of Public Economics*, 71(2), pp. 247-273.

4. Os políticos são oportunistas?

- Akhmedov, A., and Zhuravskaya, E. (2004), "Opportunistic Political Cycles: Test in a Young Democracy Setting," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 119(4), pp. 1301-1338.
- Sakurai, Sergio Naruhiko, and Naercio Menezes-Filho. "Opportunistic and partisan election cycles in Brazil: new evidence at the municipal level." *Public Choice* 148.1-2 (2011): 233-247
- Brender, A. & Drazen, A. "Political Budget Cycles in New versus Established Democracies," *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 2005.
- Dal Bó, Ernesto and Martin Rossi (2011), "Term Length and the Effort of Politicians," *Review of Economic Studies*, 78, pp. 1237-1263.
- Alt, Jim, Bueno de Mesquita, E, Shanna Rose (2011), "Disentangling Accountability and Competence in Elections: Evidence from U.S. Term Limits," *Journal of Politics*, 73(1), pp. 171-186.
- Ferraz, Claudio e Finan, Frederico (2010), "Electoral Accountability and Corruption in Local Governments: Evidence from the Audit Reports of Local Governments," *American Economic Review*, 101(4), pp. 1274-1311.

5. Qual é o impacto da campanha eleitoral?

- Claessens, Stijn; Erik Feijend and Luc Laevena (2008), "Political connections and preferential access to finance: The role of campaign contributions", *Journal of Financial Economics*, 88(3), pp. 554-580.
- De Mello, J.M.P. e Silveira, B. (2010), "Campaign Advertising and Election Outcomes: Quasi-Natural Experiment Evidence from Gubernatorial Elections in Brazil", *Review of Economic Studies*.
- Levitt, Steven D (1994), "Using Repeat Challengers to Estimate the Effect of Campaign Spending on Election Outcomes in the U.S. House", *Journal of Political Economy*, 102(4), pp. 777-98.
- Mian, Atif, Amir Sufi and Francesco Trebbi (2010), "The Political Economy of the US Mortgage Default Crisis", *American Economic Review*, 100(5), pp. 1967-98.

6. Qual é o impacto de sistema eleitoral?

- Persson, T. and G. Tabellini (2004), "Constitutional rules and fiscal policy outcomes", *American Economic Review*, 94, pp. 25-46.
- Funk, Patricia and Christina Gathmann (2010), "Does Direct Democracy reduce the Size of Government? New Evidence from Historical Data, 1890-2000", *Economic Journal*, 91, pp. 2261-2290.
- Matsusaka, J.G. (1995), "Fiscal effects of the voter initiative: evidence from the last 30 Years", *Journal of Political Economy*, 103, pp. 587-623.
- Olken, Ben (2010), "Direct Democracy and Local Public Goods: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia", *American Political Science Review*, 104 (2), pp. 243-267.
- Pettersson-Lidbom, Per and Björn Tyrefors (2007), "The Policy Consequences of Direct versus Representative Democracy: A Regression Discontinuity Approach". *Mimeo Stockholm*.
- Gagliarducci, Stefano, Tomaso Nannicini and Paolo Naticchioni (2011), "Electoral Rules and Politicians' Behavior", *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*.
- Persson, T., Tabellini, G. and F. Trebbi (2003), "Electoral rules and corruption", *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 1, pp. 958-989.

7. Democracia é melhor do que Ditadura?

- Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, James Robinson, and Pierre Yared (2008), "Income and Democracy", *American Economic Review*, 98(3), 808-842.
- Besley, Timothy, and Masayuki Kudamatsu (2006), "Health and Democracy", *American Economic Review*, 96(2), pp. 313-318.
- Ciccone, Antonio and Markus Brückner (2010), "Rain and the Democratic Window of Opportunity", *Econometrica*, 79(3), pp. 923-947.
- Dal Bo, Pedro, Andrew Foster, Louis Putterman (2010), "Institutions and Behavior: Experimental Evidence on the Effects of Democracy", *American Economic Review*, 100(5), pp. 2205-2229.
- Kudamatsu, Masayuki (2012), "Has Democratization Reduced Infant Mortality in sub-Saharan Africa? Evidence from Micro Data", *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 10(6), pp. 1294-1317.

- Mulligan, Casey B., Ricard Gil, and Xavier Sala-i-Martin (2004), "Do Democracies Have Different Public Policies Than Nondemocracies?", *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 18(1), pp. 51-74.

8. Qual é o impacto das instituições políticas?

- Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., and J. Robinson (2001), "The colonial origins of comparative development: An empirical investigation", *American Economic Review*, 91, pp.1369-1401.
- Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson (2005), "Unbundling Institutions," *Journal of Political Economy*, 113(5), pp. 949-995.
- Abhijit Banerjee and Lakshmi Iyer (2005), "History, Institutions, and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India", *American Economic Review*, 95(4), pp. 1190-1213.
- Glaeser, E., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., and Shleifer, A. (2004), "Do Institutions Cause Growth?", *Journal of Economic Growth*, 9, pp. 271-303.
- Nathan Nunn (2009), "The Importance of History for Economic Development," *Annual Review of Economics*, 1(1), pp. 65-92.
- Lakshmi Iyer (2010), "Direct versus Indirect Colonial Rule in India: Long-Term Consequences", *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, 92(4), pp. 693-713.
- Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson, 2005. "Unbundling Institutions," *Journal of Political Economy*, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(5), pages 949-995,

9. Qual é o impacto de Transferências inter-governamentais?

- Litschig & Morrison (2013) The impact of intergovernmental transfers on education outcomes and poverty reduction, *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*
- Litschig (2012) Are rules-based government programs shielded from special-interest politics? Evidence from revenue-sharing transfers in Brazil, *Journal of public Economics*
- Carvalho Filho & Litschig (2014) The Long-run and Next-generation Education Impacts of Intergovernmental Transfers, Mimeo
- Brollo, Fernanda, et al. "The Political Resource Curse." *The American Economic Review* 103.5 (2013): 1759-1796.
- Monteiro, Joana and Claudio Ferraz (2012), "Does Oil Make Leaders Unaccountable? Evidence from Brazil's Offshore Oil Boom", *PUC-Rio Mimeo*.
- Brollo, Fernanda, and Tommaso Nannicini. "Tying your enemy's hands in close races: The politics of federal transfers in Brazil." *American Political Science Review* 106.04 (2012): 742-761.
- Kosec, Katrina. "Relying on the private sector: The income distribution and public investments in the poor." *Journal of Development Economics* 107 (2014): 320-342.
- Zhuravskaya, E. (2000), "Incentives to Provide Local Public Goods," *Journal of Public Economics*, 76(3), pp. 337-368 .

10. Qual é o impacto de descentralizar política?

- Bardhan, Pranab and Mookherjee, Dilip (2005), "Decentralizing antipoverty program delivery in developing countries", *Journal of Public Economics*, 89(4), pp. 675-704.
- De Janvry, Alain; Frederico Finan and Elisabeth Sadoulet (2010), "Local Electoral Incentives and Decentralized Program Performance", NBER working paper w16635.

- Enikolopov, R. and E. Zhuravskaya (2008), "Decentralization and Political Institutions," *Journal of Public Economics*, 91 (11), pp. 2261-2290.
- Galiani, Sebastiani, Paul Gertler and Ernesto Schargrodsky (2008), "School decentralization: Helping the good get better, but leaving the poor behind", *Journal of Public Economics*, 92(10-11), pp. 2106-2120.
- Lipscomb & Mobarak (2014), Decentralization and Pollution Spillovers: Evidence from the Redrawing of County Borders in Brazil, Mimeo Yale University
- Arvate & Ponczek (2008) Municipality secession, voter's preference and persistence of power.
- Mattos & Ponczek (2013) Efeitos da Divisão Municipal na Oferta de Bens Públicos e Indicadores Sociais, *Revista Brasileira de Economia*

11. Qual é o impacto da mídia na política?

- Larreguy & Monteiro (2013) The role of media networks in compensating political biases: evidence from radio networks in Brazil, Mimeo Harvard
- Timothy Besley and Andrea Prat, "Handcuffs for the Grabbing Hand?: Media Capture and Government Accountability", *American Economic Review*.
- DellaVigna, S. and E. Kaplan (2007), "The Fox News Effect: Media Bias and Voting", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*.
- Di Tella, Rafael, and Ignacio Franceschelli (2011), "Government Advertising and Media Coverage of Corruption Scandals." *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 3(4), pp. 119-51.
- Durante, Ruben and Brian Knight (2009), "Partisan Control, Media Bias, and Viewer Responses: Evidence from Berlusconi's Italy", *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 10(3), pp. 451-481.
- Eisensee, T. and D. Stromberg (2007), "News Droughts, News Floods and U.S. Disaster Relief", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*.
- Enikolopov, R., M. Petrova and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya (2010), "Media and Political Persuasion: Evidence from Russia", *American Economic Review*, 101(7), pp. 3253-85.
- Gentzkow, Matthew, Jesse Shapiro and Michael Sinkinson (2010), "The Effect of Newspaper Entry and Exit on Electoral Politics", *American Economic Review*, 101(7), pp. 2980-3018.
- Stromberg, David (2004) "Radio's Impact on Public Spending", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*.
- Snyder, Jim and David Stromberg (2010), "Press Coverage and Political Accountability", *Journal of Political Economy*, 118(2).
- Besley, Timothy and Robin Burgess (2002), "The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 117(4), pp. 1415-1451.

12. Quais são os determinantes e impactos de violência política?

- Acemoglu, Daron; James A. Robinson and Rafael Santos (2009), "The Monopoly of Violence: Evidence from Colombia," NBER Working Papers 15578.
- Besley, Tim and Torsten Persson (2010), "The Logic of Political Violence", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 126(3), pp. 1411-1445.
- Gould, Eric D. and Esteban F. Klor (2010), "Does Terrorism Work?", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, vol. 125(4), pp. 1459-1510.

13. Qual é o impacto de populações heterogêneas sobre política econômica?

- Alesina, A., Baqir, R., Easterly, W. (1999), "Public Goods and Ethnic Divisions", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 114(4), pp.1243-84.
- Miguel, E. (2004), "Tribe or Nation? Nation-Building and Public Goods in Kenya versus Tanzania", *World Politics*, 56 (3), pp. 327-362.
- Miguel, E. and Mary Kay Gugerty (2005), "Ethnic Divisions, Social Sanctions, and Public Goods in Kenya", *Journal of Public Economics*, 89(11-12), pp. 2325-2368.
- Easterly, W. and R. Levine (1997), "Africa's Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 112(4), pp.1203-50.
- Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2012), "Segregation and the quality of government", *American Economic Review*.
- Alberto Alesina & Reza Baqir & Caroline Hoxby (2004), "Political Jurisdictions in Heterogeneous Communities", *Journal of Political Economy*, 112(2), pp. 348-396.
- Alberto Alesina & Eliana La Ferrara (2000), "Participation In Heterogeneous Communities", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 115(3), pp. 847-904.
- Alesina, Alberto and Eliana La Ferrara (2002). "Who trusts others?," *Journal of Public Economics*, 85(2), pp. 207-234.

14. Qual é o impacto da persistência de poder político?

- Acemoglu, Daron and Robinson, James A. (2006), "Economic Backwardness in Political Perspective", *American Political Science Review*.
- Acemoglu, Daron and James Robinson (2008), "Persistence of Power, Elites and Institutions", *American Economic Review*, 98(1), pp. 267-93.
- Acemoglu et al. (2008), "Economic and Political Inequality in Development: The Case of Cundinamarca, Colombia" in *Institutions and Economic Performance*, Edited by Elhanan Helpman, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
- Aghion, P. Alberto Alesina and Francesco Trebbi (2008), "Electoral Rules and Minority Representation in US Cities", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 123(1), pp. 325-357.
- Coate, Stephen and Morris, Stephen E. (1999), "Policy Persistence", *American Economic Review*, 89(5), pp. 1327-1336.
- Dal Bó, Pedro, Ernesto Dal Bó and Jason Snyder (2009), "Political Dynasties", *Review of Economic Studies*, 76(1).
- Ferraz, Claudio and Frederico Finan (2010), "Political Power Persistence and Economic Development: Evidence from Brazil's Regime Transition", *PUC-Rio, mimeo*.
- Roland, Gerard (2004), "Understanding Institutional Change: Fast-Moving and Slow-Moving Institutions", *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 38, pp. 109-131.
- Naritomi, Soares, and Assunção "Rent Seeking and the Unveiling of 'De Facto' Institutions: Development and Colonial Heritage within Brazil", NBER working paper