

ECONOMIA DO SETOR PÚBLICO II (POLITICAL ECONOMICS)

Michael Christian Lehmann
clehmann.unb@gmail.com
www.christian-lehmann.net

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Este curso expõe as respostas empíricas para perguntas importantes da economia política no setor público, e visa dotar os alunos com um conjunto de ferramentas empíricas de investigação comuns à área que possam inspirar suas dissertações de mestrado/doutorado.

Avisos importantes

- todos os materiais de aula encontrar-se-ão no meu site www.christian-lehmann.net
- meu horário de atendimento ao aluno: agendamento online ([clique aqui](#))
- data entrega parecer #1: dia 17 de abril de 2016 (entrega por email)
- data entrega parecer #2: dia 22 de maio de 2016 (entrega por email)
- data entrega projeto econométrico: dia 26 de junho de 2016 (entrega por email de um arquivo .zip que contem seu do-file e base de dados)
- grupo de emails da disciplina ([inscrição aqui](#))

Avaliação

Itens de avaliação e peso na nota final:

- participação (50%)
- parecer de trabalhos (20%)
- exercício econométrico (20%)
- apresentações (10%)

Detalhes:

- Participação
 - Participação inclui ler e opinar sobre os artigos designados para cada aula. Eu vou avaliar a sua participação em cada aula. Cada aula vale 0,3 pontos da nota final. Nas 17 aulas do semestre, portanto, você pode ganhar até 5,1 pontos da nota final. Se você falta em uma determinada aula, você ganha zero pontos

para esta aula. Se você chega atrasado ou sai cedo em uma determinada aula (ou chega atrasado do intervalo) eu vou tirar $0,01 \times m$ pontos da sua pontuação dessa aula (onde m é sua ausência em minutos). Ou seja, se você falta mais que 30 minutos em uma aula, a sua pontuação dessa aula é zero.

- Apresentações
 - você vai apresentar dois artigos da ementa
 - Clique aqui para informar os artigos que você escolheu
 - Dois alunos não podem apresentar o mesmo artigo. Quem informa primeiro o artigo ganha o direito de apresentar
 - Cada apresentação deve resumir brevemente o artigo (pergunta de pesquisa, métodos, resultados, conclusão)
 - Uma apresentação não deve ultrapassar quinze minutos
 - Cada apresentação deve ser preparada em \LaTeX
- Pareceres:
 - Pareceres são uma parte fundamental da vida acadêmica. Se você submete um artigo para uma revista acadêmica, o editor da revista vai pedir outros acadêmicos de escrever um parecer sobre seu artigo. Baseado nestes pareceres, o editor rejeita ou aceita o artigo para publicação
 - Você vai escrever dois pareceres sobre dois dos artigos da ementa
 - Não é permitido escolher artigos que você já escolheu para as apresentações
 - Cada parecer deve ser de até (e cerca de) três páginas com espaçamento simples
 - O parecer deve começar com um curto parágrafo de resumo do artigo. Em seguida, deve apresentar as principais críticas do artigo. O parecer deve concluir com comentários de menor relevância. Um bom parecer não somente resalta claramente as deficiências do artigo, mas também oferece sugestões construtivas, detalhadas e realistas para sua melhoria. Clique aqui para mais informações sobre como escrever um bom parecer
 - Cada parecer deve ser preparado em \LaTeX
 - É proibido trabalho em grupo.
- Exercício econométrico:
 - Você deve tentar replicar os resultados de um dos artigos da ementa
 - Acesse o site da revista acadêmica onde o artigo foi publicado e baixe os dados e o do-file do artigo
 - Primeiro, no do-file dos autores, você deve fazer comentários descrevendo o código dos autores com suas próprias palavras
 - Segundo, veja se você consegue replicar os resultados principais do artigo. Simplesmente roda o do-file dos autores e vê se ele replica os resultados do artigo. No fim do do-file faz um comentário informando se você conseguiu replicar os resultados.

- Terceiro, faz pelo menos uma extensão do artigo. Isso pode ser:
 - * um teste de robustez: Por exemplo, você poderia incluir mais alguma variável de controle na regressão, ou seja uma variável que você acha poderia ser correlacionado tanto com a variável explicativa chave dos autores quanto com a variável dependente, e vê se isso muda as conclusões do artigo; ou você poderia excluir observações com valores muito grandes (tanto na variável dependente quanto nas variáveis explicativas chaves) para ver se as conclusões do artigo dependem dessas observações; ou você poderia adicionar um termo quadrático da principal variável explicativa, para testar se a relação entre X e Y na verdade não é linear, mas concava ou convexa.
 - * estimar regressões quantílicas (*quantile regressions*)
 - * estimar efeitos heterogêneos (*heterogenous effects*). Por exemplo, se o artigo estima o impacto das transferências federais para os municípios (X) sobre corrupção no governo municipal (Y), veja se o impacto é diferente para prefeitos masculinos e femininos
 - * alguma outra extensão que você acha interessante (mas fala comigo antes para receber meu OK)
- Se você não tiver acesso ao STATA, use o R que você pode baixar gratuitamente neste link ([clique aqui](#))
- Este exercício foi uma das coisas que os alunos dos anos passados mais gostaram. Em alguns casos sugeriram ideias concretas pela dissertação de mestrado/doutorado. Para ter uma experiência parecida, e para ter uma boa aprendizagem, tente não deixar este exercício para a última hora, e busca minha ajuda quando precisa.

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1 Determinantes do comportamento de políticos

1.1 O teorema do eleitor mediano

Leitura obrigatória

- Bardhan, Pranab and Dilip Mookherjee (2010) “Determinants of Redistributive Politics: An Empirical Analysis of Land Reforms in West Bengal, India”, *American Economic Review*, 100(4), pp. 1572-1600.
- Husted and Kenny (1997), “The effects of the expansion of the voting franchise on the size of government”, *Journal of Political Economy*, 105, 1997, pp. 54-81.
- Miller, G. (2008), “Women’s Suffrage, Political Responsiveness, and Child Survival in American History”, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 123(3), pp. 1287-1327.
- Bursztyn (2013) Poverty and the Political Economy of Public Education Spending: Evidence from Brazil, Mimeo

Leitura complementar

- Cho, S. J., & Duggan, J. (2009). Bargaining foundations of the median voter theorem. *Journal of Economic Theory*, 144(2), 851-868.
- Gerber, E. R., & Lewis, J. B. (2004). Beyond the median: Voter preferences, district heterogeneity, and political representation. *Journal of Political Economy*, 112(6), 1364-1383.
- Milanovic, B. (2000). The median-voter hypothesis, income inequality, and income redistribution: an empirical test with the required data. *European Journal of Political Economy*, 16(3), 367-410.

1.2 Ideologia

Leitura obrigatória

- Lee, David S., Enrico Moretti, and Matthew Butler, (2004), “Do Voters Affect or Elect Policies? Evidence from the U.S. House”, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 119(3), pp. 807-860.
- Petterson-Lidbom, Per (2008), “Do Parties Matter for Economic Outcomes: A Regression-Discontinuity Approach,” *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 6(5), pp. 1037–1056.
- Snowberg, Erik, Justin Wolfers and Eric Zitzewitz (2007), “Partisan Impacts on the Economy: Evidence from Prediction Markets and Close Elections”, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 122(2), pp.807-829.
- Levitt, S. (1996), “How do senators vote? Disentangling the role of voter preferences, party affiliation, and senator ideology”, *American Economic Review*, 86, pp. 425-441.

- Washington, E. (2008). “Female Socialization: How Daughters Affect Their Legislator Fathers’ Voting on Women’s Issues,” *American Economic Review*, 98(1), pp. 311-332.
- Jones, Ben, and Ben Olken (2005), “Do Leaders Matter? National Leadership and Growth since World War II”, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 120(3), pp. 835-864.
- Pande, R. (2003) “Can Mandated Political Representation Increase Policy Influence for Disadvantaged Minorities? Theory and Evidence from India”, *American Economic Review*, 93, pp. 1132-1151.
- Chattopadhyay, R. and E. Duflo (2004), ”Women as policy makers: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in India”, *Econometrica*, 72, pp. 1409-1443.
- Brollo & Troiano (2014) What Happens When a Woman Wins an Election? Evidence from Close Races in Brazil, Mimeo
- Ferraz, Bragança & Rios (2015) Political Dynasties and the Quality of Government, Mimeo

Leitura complementar

- Ferreira, Fernando and Joseph Gyourko (2009) ”Do Political Parties Matter? Evidence from U.S. Cities”, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 124(1), pp. 399-422.
- Levitt, S., and J. Snyder (1995), ”Political parties and the distribution of federal outlays”, *American Journal of Political Science*, 39, pp. 958-80.
- Acemoglu, Daron, Georgy Egorov and Konstantin Sonin (2010), “Political Selection and Persistence of Bad Governments”, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 125(4), pp. 1511-1575.
- Besley, Timothy (2005), “Political Selection”, *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 19(3), pp. 43-60.
- Caselli, Francesco and Morelli, Massimo (2004), “Bad politicians”, *Journal of Public Economics*, 88(3-4), pp. 759-782.

1.3 Eleições próximas

Leitura obrigatória

- Sakurai, Sergio Naruhiko, and Naercio Menezes-Filho. ”Opportunistic and partisan election cycles in Brazil: new evidence at the municipal level.” *Public Choice* 148.1-2 (2011): 233-247
- Akhmedov, A., and Zhuravskaya, E. (2004), “Opportunistic Political Cycles: Test in a Young Democracy Setting”, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 119(4), pp. 1301-1338.
- Brender, A. & Drazen, A. “Political Budget Cycles in New versus Established Democracies”, *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 2005.

- Alt, J. E., & Lassen, D. D. (2006). Transparency, Political Polarization, and Political Budget Cycles in OECD Countries. *American Journal of Political Science*, 50(3), 530-550.

Leitura complementar

- Klomp, J., & De Haan, J. (2013). Do political budget cycles really exist?. *Applied Economics*, 45(3), 329-341.
- Streb, J. M., Lema, D., & Torrens, G. (2009). Checks and Balances on Political Budget Cycles: Cross-Country Evidence. *Kyklos*, 62(3), 426-447.
- Klomp, J., & De Haan, J. (2013). Political budget cycles and election outcomes. *Public Choice*, 157(1-2), 245-267.
- Canes-Wrone, B., & Park, J. K. (2012). Electoral business cycles in OECD countries. *American Political Science Review*, 106(01), 103-122.
- Saporiti, A., & Streb, J. M. (2008). Separation of powers and political budget cycles. *Public Choice*, 137(1-2), 329-345.

1.4 A mídia

Leitura obrigatória

A influencia da mídia sobre os politicos:

- Besley, Timothy and Robin Burgess (2002), "The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 117(4), pp. 1415-1451.
- Stromberg, David (2004) "Radio's Impact on Public Spending", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*.
- Eisensee, T. and D. Stromberg (2007), "News Droughts, News Floods and U.S. Disaster Relief," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*.
- Larreguy & Monteiro (2013) The role of media networks in compensating political biases: evidence from radio networks in Brazil, Mimeo Harvard
- Lim, Claire SH, James M. Snyder Jr, and David Strömberg. "The judge, the politician, and the press: newspaper coverage and criminal sentencing across electoral systems." *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 7.4 (2015): 103-135.

A influencia dos politicos sobre a mídia:

- Di Tella, Rafael, and Ignacio Franceschelli (2011), "Government Advertising and Media Coverage of Corruption Scandals." *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 3(4), pp. 119-51.

Leitura complementar

- Gentzkow, M., & Shapiro, J. M. (2010). What drives media slant? Evidence from US daily newspapers. *Econometrica*, 78(1), 35-71.
- Engelberg, J. E., & Parsons, C. A. (2011). The causal impact of media in financial markets. *The Journal of Finance*, 66(1), 67-97.
- Snyder Jr, J. M., & Strömberg, D. (2010). Press Coverage and Political Accountability. *Journal of Political Economy*, 118(2), 355-408.
- Pande, R. (2011). Can informed voters enforce better governance? Experiments in low-income democracies. *Annu. Rev. Econ.*, 3(1), 215-237.
- Miner, L. (2015). The unintended consequences of Internet diffusion: Evidence from Malaysia. *Journal of Public Economics*, 132, 66-78.
- Drago, F., Nannicini, T., & Sobbrío, F. (2014). Meet the press: How voters and politicians respond to newspaper entry and exit. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 6(3), 159-188.

1.5 Duração do mandato/Limites de mandatos

Leitura obrigatória

Duração do mandato:

- Dal Bó, Ernesto and Martin Rossi (2011), “Term Length and the Effort of Politicians”, *Review of Economic Studies*, 78, pp.1237-1263.
- Titiunik, R. (2014). Drawing your senator from a jar: Term length and legislative behavior. *Political Science Research and Methods*, 1-24.

Limites de mandatos:

- Padro-i Miguel, Gerard, and James M. Snyder (2006), “Legislative Effectiveness and Legislative Life”, *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 31(3), pp. 347-381.
- De Janvry, A., Finan, F., & Sadoulet, E. (2012). Local electoral incentives and decentralized program performance. *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 94(3), 672-685.
- Ferraz, Claudio e Finan, Frederico (2010), ”Electoral Accountability and Corruption in Local Governments: Evidence from the Audit Reports of Local Governments”, *American Economic Review*, 101(4), pp. 1274-1311.

Leitura complementar

- Schultz, C. (2008). Information, polarization and term length in democracy. *Journal of Public Economics*, 92(5), 1078-1091.
- Herrick, R., Moore, M. K., & Hibbing, J. R. (1994). Unfastening the electoral connection: the behavior of US Representatives when reelection is no longer a factor. *The Journal of Politics*, 56(01), 214-227.

- Alt, Jim, Bueno de Mesquita, E, Shanna Rose (2011), “Disentangling Accountability and Competence in Elections: Evidence from U.S. Term Limits”, *Journal of Politics*, 73(1), pp. 171-186.

1.6 Salario

Leitura obrigatória

- Ferraz, Claudio e Frederico Finan (2009), “Motivating Politicians: The Impacts of Monetary Incentives on Quality and Performance”, NBER working paper.
- Gagliarducci, S., & Nannicini, T. (2013). Do better paid politicians perform better? Disentangling incentives from selection. *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 11(2), 369-398.

2 Determinantes do comportamento de eleitores

2.1 Despesa publica

Leitura obrigatória

- Levitt, S. D. and J. M. Snyder, (1997), ”The impact of federal spending on House election outcomes,” *Journal of Political Economy*, 105(1), pp. 30-53.
- Samuels, D. J. (2002). Pork barreling is not credit claiming or advertising: Campaign finance and the sources of the personal vote in Brazil. *The Journal of Politics*, 64(03), 845-863.
- Sakurai, Sergio Naruhiko, and Naercio Aquino Menezes-Filho. ”Fiscal policy and reelection in Brazilian municipalities.” *Public Choice* 137.1-2 (2008): 301-314.
- Litschig, Stephan and Kevin Morrison (2010), “Government Spending and Re-election: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Brazilian Municipalities”. Mimeo, UPF.
- Zucco, C. (2013). When payouts pay off: Conditional cash transfers and voting behavior in Brazil 2002–10. *American Journal of Political Science*, 57(4), 810-822.
- De La O, Ana L. 2013. “Do Conditional Cash Transfers Affect Electoral Behavior? Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in Mexico.” *American Journal of Political Science* 57(1): 1–14.
- Manacorda, Marco, Edward Miguel, and Andrea Vigorito. (2011). “Government Transfers and Political Support”, *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 3(3), pp. 1-28.
- Pop-Eleches, Christian, and Grigore Pop-Eleches. 2012. “Government Spending and Pocketbook Voting: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Romania.” *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 7(3): 285–320.
- Matarazzo, Hellen (2014): Políticas de saúde influenciam o eleitor? Dissertação de Mestrado, UnB

Leitura complementar

- Brusco, V., Nazareno, M., & Stokes, S. C. (2004). Vote buying in Argentina. *Latin American Research Review*, 39(2), 66-88.
- Nichter, S. (2008). Vote buying or turnout buying? Machine politics and the secret ballot. *American political science review*, 102(01), 19-31.
- Gonzalez Ocantos, E., De Jonge, C. K., Meléndez, C., Osorio, J., & Nickerson, D. W. (2012). Vote buying and social desirability bias: Experimental evidence from Nicaragua. *American Journal of Political Science*, 56(1), 202-217.
- Firpo, Sergio, Vladimir Ponczek, and Viviane Sanfelice. "The relationship between federal budget amendments and local electoral power." *Journal of Development Economics* 116 (2015): 186-198.
- Finan, Frederico, and Laura Schechter. "Vote Buying and Reciprocity." *Econometrica* 80.2 (2012): 863-881.
- Bratton, M. (2008). Vote buying and violence in Nigerian election campaigns. *Electoral studies*, 27(4), 621-632.
- Hastings, J. S., Kane, T. J., Staiger, D. O., & Weinstein, J. M. (2007). The effect of randomized school admissions on voter participation. *Journal of Public Economics*, 91(5), 915-937.
- Casaburi, L., & Troiano, U. (2016). Ghost-House Busters: the Electoral Response to a Large Anti Tax Evasion Program. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*

2.2 Informação sobre políticos

Leitura obrigatória

- Kendall, C., Nannicini, T., & Trebbi, F. (2015). How Do Voters Respond to Information? Evidence from a Randomized Campaign. *American Economic Review*, 105(1), 322-53.
- Banerjee, Abhijit et al. (2010), "Do Informed Voters Make Better Choices? Experimental Evidence from Urban India". Mimeo, MIT.
- Gerber, A. S., & Green, D. P. (2000). The effects of canvassing, telephone calls, and direct mail on voter turnout: A field experiment. *American Political Science Review*, 94(03), 653-663.
- Gine and Mansuri (2012) "Together We Will: Experimental Evidence on Female Voting Behavior in Pakistan", Mimeo

Leitura complementar

- Pande, R. (2011). Can Informed Voters Enforce Better Governance? Experiments in Low Income Democracies. *Annual Review of Economics* 3, 215-237.

- Wantchekon, L. (2003). Clientelism and voting behavior: Evidence from a field experiment in Benin. *World politics*, 55(03), 399-422.
- Fujiwara, Thomas, and Leonard Wantchekon. 2013. "Can Informed Public Deliberation Overcome Clientelism? Experimental Evidence from Benin." *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 5(4): 241-55.

2.3 A mídia

Leitura obrigatória

A influencia da midia sobre o eleitor:

- Gentzkow, Matthew, Jesse Shapiro and Michael Sinkinson (2010), "The Effect of Newspaper Entry and Exit on Electoral Politics", *American Economic Review*, 101(7), pp. 2980-3018.
- Gentzkow, M. (2006). Television and voter turnout. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 931-972.
- Falck, O., Gold, R., & Heblich, S. (2014). E-lections: Voting behavior and the internet. *The American Economic Review*, 104(7), 2238-2265.
- DellaVigna, S. and E. Kaplan (2007), "The Fox News Effect: Media Bias and Voting", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*.
- Enikolopov, R., M. Petrova and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya (2010), "Media and Political Persuasion: Evidence from Russia", *American Economic Review*, 101(7), pp. 3253-85.
- Durante, Ruben and Brian Knight (2009), "Partisan Control, Media Bias, and Viewer Responses: Evidence from Berlusconi's Italy", *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 10(3), pp. 451-481.
- La Ferrara, Eliana, Alberto Chong, and Suzanne Duryea. "Soap operas and fertility: Evidence from Brazil." *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 4.4 (2012): 1-31.
- Dahl, G., & DellaVigna, S. (2009). Does movie violence increase violent crime?. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 677-734.
- Yanagizawa-Drott, D. (2014). Propaganda and conflict: Evidence from the Rwandan genocide. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 129(4), 1947-1994.

Leitura complementar

- Snyder, J. and D. Stromberg (2010). Press Coverage and Electoral Accountability. *Journal of Political Economy* 118 (1), 355–408.
- Olken, B. A. (2009). Do Television and Radio Destroy Social Capital? Evidence from Indonesian Villages. *American Economic Journal. Applied Economics*, 1(4), 1.

2.4 Corrupção

Leitura obrigatória

- Ferraz, C. e Finan, C. (2008), “Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effect of Brazil’s Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes”, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 123, pp. 703-745.
- Brollo, Fernanda (2010) Why Do Voters Punish Corrupt Politicians? Evidence from the Brazilian Anti-Corruption Program, Mimeo
- Figueiredo, Hidalgo, Kasahara (2014) When Do Voters Punish Corrupt Politicians? Experimental Evidence from Brazil, Mimeo
- Chong, A., Ana, L., Karlan, D., & Wantchekon, L. (2015). Does corruption information inspire the fight or quash the hope? A field experiment in Mexico on voter turnout, choice, and party identification. *The Journal of Politics*, 77(1), 55-71.

Leitura complementar

- Chang, E. C., and M. A. Golden, “Political Corruption, Incumbency and Reelection in the Postwar Italian Chamber of Deputies,” mimeo, UCLA, 2004.
- Glaeser, E. L., and R. Saks, “Corruption in America,” *Journal of Public Economics* 90(6) (2006), 1053–1073.
- Olken, B. A., “Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia,” *Journal of Political Economy* 115(2) (2007), 200–249.
- Peters, J. G., and S. Welch, “The Effects of Charges of Corruption on Voting Behavior in Congressional Elections,” *American Political Science Review*, 74 (1980), 697–708.
- Reinikka, R., and J. Svensson, “Fighting Corruption to Improve Schooling: Evidence from a Newspaper Campaign in Uganda, *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 3(2–3) (2005), 259–267.

3 O sistema eleitoral

3.1 Eleições majoritárias vs proporcionais

Leitura obrigatória

- Persson, T. and G. Tabellini (2004), “Constitutional rules and fiscal policy outcomes”, *American Economic Review*, 94, pp. 25-46.
- Funk, Patricia, and Christina Gathmann. ”How do electoral systems affect fiscal policy? Evidence from cantonal parliaments, 1890–2000.” *Journal of the European Economic Association* 11.5 (2013): 1178-1203.
- Gagliarducci, Stefano, Tomaso Nannicini and Paolo Naticchioni (2011), ”Electoral Rules and Politicians’ Behavior”, *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*.

- Persson, T., Tabellini, G. and F. Trebbi (2003), “Electoral rules and corruption”, *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 1, pp. 958-989.

Leitura complementar

- Blume, L., Müller, J., Voigt, S., & Wolf, C. (2009). The economic effects of constitutions: replicating—and extending—Persson and Tabellini. *Public Choice*, 139(1-2), 197-225.
- Persson, T. (2004). Consequences of constitutions. *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 139-161.
- Fredriksson, P. G., & Millimet, D. L. (2004). Electoral rules and environmental policy. *Economics letters*, 84(2), 237-244.
- Beath, A., Christia, F., Egorov, G., & Enikolopov, R. (2014). Electoral rules and the quality of politicians: theory and evidence from a field experiment in Afghanistan (No. w20082). National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Rockey, J. (2012). Reconsidering the fiscal effects of constitutions. *European Journal of Political Economy*, 28(3), 313-323.
- Chamon, M., de Mello, J. M., & Firpo, S. (2008). Electoral rules, political competition and fiscal spending: regression discontinuity evidence from Brazilian municipalities. PUC-Rio Discussion Paper, 559.
- Bordignon, M., & Monticini, A. (2012). The importance of the electoral rule: Evidence from Italy. *Economics Letters*, 117(1), 322-325.

3.2 Democracia direta vs democracia representativa

Leitura obrigatória

- Matsusaka, J.G. (1995), “Fiscal effects of the voter initiative: evidence from the last 30 Years”, *Journal of Political Economy*, 103, pp. 587-623.
- Pettersson-Lidbom, Per and Björn Tyrefors (2007), ”The Policy Consequences of Direct versus Representative Democracy: A Regression Discontinuity Approach”. Mimeo Stockholm.
- Funk, Patricia and Christina Gathmann (2010), “Does Direct Democracy reduce the Size of Government? New Evidence from Historical Data, 1890-2000”, *Economic Journal*, 91, pp. 2261–2290.
- Olken, Ben (2010), “Direct Democracy and Local Public Goods: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia”, *American Political Science Review*, 104 (2), pp. 243-267.

3.3 Organização legislativa

Leitura obrigatória

- Baqir, Reza (2002), “Districting and Government Overspending”, *Journal of Political Economy*, 110.
- Egger, Peter and Marko Koethenbueger (2010), “Government Spending and Legislative Organization: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Germany”, *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 2, pp. 200-212.
- de Melo Castro, Carlos Renato & Christian Lehmann (2014) *Gasto Público e Organização Legislativa: Evidência da Lei 1/n para o Brasil*. ANPEC 2014

4 Relações inter-governamentais

4.1 Transferências inter-governamentais

Leitura obrigatória

- Litschig & Morrison (2013) The impact of intergovernmental transfers on education outcomes and poverty reduction, *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*
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